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Starting from MM’s theories, we discuss some important topics in capital market research
in taxation. We use this article to introduce intuitions and techniques of capital market
research in taxation to Chinese researchers. While it is apparent that many Chinese
researchers have already mastered these techniques, we hope that more researchers will
be interested in this line of research. We believe that China provides fertile ground for cap-
ital market research in taxation.
 2011 China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
University of Hong Kong. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. From MM with Inspirations
Many inspirations for capital market research in taxation come from Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Modigliani and
Miller (1958, 1963). These articles form the two pillars of modern corporate ﬁnance research. In these articles, Miller and
Modigliani argue that in a perfect market and in the absence of taxes, a ﬁrm’s payout policy and capital structure do not
affect its value. However, they acknowledge that taxes can make a ﬁrm’s payout policy and capital structure value-relevant.
This naturally establishes taxes as an important topic in capital market research.nal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.
served.
w of capital market research in taxation. For literature reviews, readers can consult Shackelford and
zman (2010). Instead, this article is based on our own experience with research in capital markets and
Professor Xijia Su of China-Europe International Business School and Professor Feng Liu of Xiamen
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Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that in a perfect market and without taxes, dividend policy does not affect ﬁrm value.
They also acknowledge that there are many factors that can make a ﬁrm’s dividend policy value-relevant and that an impor-
tant one is tax. They state that ‘‘Of all the market imperfections that might be detailed, the only one that would seem to be
even remotely capable of producing such a concentration is the substantial advantage accorded to capital gains as compared
with dividends under the personal income tax.’’ Apparently, in maintaining their dividend irrelevancy story, they try to
discount the role of taxes.
Subsequent researchers have incorporated the differential taxation of dividends versus capital gains in stock return mod-
els, such as Brennan (1970) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979, 1980, 1982). If dividends are taxed at a higher rate
than capital gains, such as in the United States, then stock returns should increase with dividend yield. This is the concept
of dividend tax capitalization. That is, in equilibrium, investors will have to be compensated for investing in an asset or a
stream of income that is more heavily taxed.
1.2. Tax and capital structure
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that without taxes, a ﬁrm’s capital structure does not affect its value but there is an
equity risk premium associated with leverage. In their attempt to incorporate corporate taxes, they make a mistake by taking
it for granted that corporate taxes just affect ﬁrm value and therefore stock returns proportionately. This is not the case.
Modigliani and Miller (1963) correct this oversight. This episode, however, should help us better appreciate the importance
of taxes in capital market research. They show that with corporate taxes and the tax deductibility of interest expense, ﬁrm
value increases and the leverage-induced risk premium decreases.
Miller (1977) further introduces personal level taxes for both debt income and equity income and shows that they also
affect ﬁrm value through ﬁnancial leverage. Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) and Miller (1977) predict that with a corpo-
rate tax, ﬁnancial leverage increases ﬁrm value. However, when debt income is taxed at a relatively higher rate than equity
income, the value enhancing role of ﬁnancial leverage is mitigated. If we invert Miller (1977) into a cost of equity capital
model, then we have three predictions. First, a ﬁrm’s cost of equity capital increases with ﬁnancial leverage. Second, the
leverage induced equity premium is negatively associated with the corporate tax rate. Third, the leverage induced equity
premium increases with the relative taxation of debt income versus equity income.2. Empirical implications and test settings
2.1. Dividend policy
Differential taxation of dividends versus capital gains affects a ﬁrm’s dividend policy. For example, high dividend yield
ﬁrms attract investors with a low tax rate on dividend income and low dividend yield ﬁrms attract investors with a high
tax rate on dividend income. This relation can also go the other way around. Investors with a low tax rate on dividend in-
come induce ﬁrms to pay more dividends and investors with a high tax rate on dividend income induce ﬁrms to pay less
dividends. This is called the dividend tax clientele effect. Elton and Gruber (1970), Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Grinstein
and Michaely (2005) and many others ﬁnd evidence supporting this clientele effect.
More importantly, in equilibrium, a ﬁrm’s dividend policy affects its value or expected return when dividend income and
capital gains are taxed at different rates. Let RBT be the expected return of a dividend-paying stock, RTF be the expected re-
turn of a tax-free security of the same risk class, d be the dividend-paying ﬁrm’s dividend yield, td be the tax rate on dividend
income and tg be the tax rate on capital gains income, we haveRBT ¼ RTF1 tg þ
td  tg
1 tg d; ð1Þwhere the second part of the equation is the equity risk premium associated with dividend yield if td > tg.
Researchers can test if equity returns are positively associated with dividend yield when td > tg, negatively associated with
dividend yield when td < tg, or unassociated with dividend yield when td = tg. In fact, many studies have been conducted test-
ing a positive association between stock returns and dividend yield in the US. While earlier studies ﬁnd mixed evidence,
more recent studies generally support a positive association. For examine, Dhaliwal et al. (2005) ﬁnd that a ﬁrm’s cost of
equity capital increases in tax penalized dividend yield relative to capital gains in the US. This positive association is miti-
gated when the level of institutional investors who are less likely to be tax penalized on dividend versus capital gains income
increases.
Another way to determine whether there is an equity risk premium associated with dividend yield is to examine the stock
price movement on ex-dividend days. Without taxes, stock prices should drop on average by the amount of the dividend on
the ex-dividend day. However, researchers generally ﬁnd that on average stock prices drop by an amount that is lower than
that of the dividend (Elton and Gruber, 1970). There is a simple tax explanation that is reﬂected in the following equation
when a seller is indifferent between selling shares before and after the ex-dividend day:
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D
¼ 1 td
1 tg ð2Þwhere PCUM is the cum-dividend stock price, PEX is the ex-dividend stock price and D is the dividend per share.
With td > tg, which is historically the case in the US, the price drop to dividend ratio is predicted to be lower than 1. This
explains why and how the price drop on ex-dividend days is lower than the amount of the dividend. This ratio of less than 1
also easily translates into an abnormally high stock return on the ex-dividend day of (td  tg)/(1  tg)d in Eq. (1).
Ex-dividend day stock price movements or abnormal stock returns are a major corporate ﬁnance research topic with
more than 100 papers published in top journals since Elton and Gruber (1970). Even though researchers have attempted
non-tax explanations, such as Frank and Jagannathan (1998) and Bali and Hite (1998), the current consensus appears to sup-
port the tax explanation. It is important to note that Frank and Jaganathan (1998) is based on Hong Kong, China, a jurisdic-
tion with no taxes on dividends or capital gains.
The ex-dividend setting also easily lends itself to trading volume studies. Trading volume is important because it reﬂects
investors’ trading behavior and differential preferences and therefore clienteles. Volume increases around ex-dividend days
due to the fact that different investors have different tax rates on dividends and capital gains, that is, their tax preferences for
dividends versus capital gains are different. We call this tax-induced investor heterogeneity (Michaely and Vila, 1995). If
investors can trade with each other properly around the ex-dividend days, they can reduce their tax burdens. For example,
investors with a high tax rate on dividends can sell shares before the ex-dividend days and/or buy shares after the ex-div-
idend days in order to avoid the dividend; investors with a high tax rate on capital gains can buy shares before the ex-div-
idend days and/or sell shares after the ex-dividend days in order to capture the dividend. This process induced by tax
heterogeneity drives up trading volume and can be summarized in the following equation (Michaely and Vila, 1995):Ve ¼ 12D
XN
t¼1
ðai  aÞ Kir2e
 

" #
ð3Þwhere D is the amount of the dividend per share, Ki is the level of risk tolerance for investor i, ai is the tax-induced preference
for dividends versus capital gains for investor i, a is the average preference for dividends versus capital gains in the economy,
weighted by investors’ levels of risk tolerance Ki, r2e is the total risk of a stock and N is the total number of investors in the
economy.
A practical way of examining the effect of tax-induced heterogeneity on ex-dividend trading volume is to assume that
there are roughly two types of investors in the market, individual investors and institutional investors. In the US setting,
institutional investors are more likely than individual investors to prefer dividends over capital gains. In fact, as long as insti-
tutional investors and individual investors differ in their tax preferences for dividends versus capital gains, they can trade in
a certain fashion to reduce their tax burdens and therefore drive up trading volume. The intuition is rather simple. When the
level of institutional ownership is relatively low, tax induced tax heterogeneity is low (everyone is an individual investor)
and trading volume will be low. When the level of institutional ownership is relatively high, tax induced heterogeneity is
again low (everyone is an institutional investor) and trading volume will be low. When the level of institutional ownership
is in between these extremes, tax induced heterogeneity is high (a combination of individual and institutional investors) and
trading volume will be high. Therefore, trading volume is an increasing and concave function of institutional ownership
(Dhaliwal and Li, 2006) as reﬂected in the following equation:Ve ¼ D2r2e
½n1ja1  ajK1 þ n2ja2  ajK2
Ve ¼ D2r2e
ðK1 þ K2Þja1  a2jn1ðN  n1Þ=K1n1 þ K2ðN  n1Þ ð4Þwhere N = n1 + n2 is the total number of investors in the economy for the underlying stock, and n1 and n2 are the number of
Category 1 and Category 2 investors. Dhaliwal and Li (2006) ﬁnd that ex-dividend day trading volume ﬁrst increases and
then decreases in the level of institutional ownership or the ratio of the number of large trades to the number of all trades
(a dynamic proxy for the presence of institutional investors).
Further, the ex-dividend setting is particularly conducive for studying directional trading volume since the theory would
predict how a speciﬁc group of investors would trade in a certain fashion to mitigate their tax liabilities. Li (2010) is an at-
tempt to determine whether institutional investors, who are taxed less on dividend income relative to capital gains income,
buy shares before they go ex-dividend. Using high frequency data and estimating the directions of trades and the identities
of traders, he ﬁnds that institutional investors are more likely to capture dividends by buying shares before they go ex-div-
idend than individual investors. This kind of trading behavior is consistent with investors’ differential tax preferences for
dividends versus capital gains.
2.2. Capital structure
Based on Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) and Miller (1977), corporate and personal level taxes affect ﬁrm value, ex-
pected return (cost of equity capital) and ﬁnancial leverage. Graham (1996a,b) shows that ﬁrms increase their debt levels
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(1999, 2000) further identiﬁes a negative personal level tax effect on ﬁrms’ use of debt. When personal level tax rate on inter-
est income is high relative to that on equity income, ﬁrms reduce their debt use.
Dhaliwal et al. (2006) examine the effect of leverage and taxes on ﬁrms’ cost of equity capital. They show that a ﬁrm’s cost
of equity capital is a function of its ﬁnancial leverage, corporate taxes and personal level taxes for shareholders and bond-
holders in the following manner:KL ¼ KU þ ð1 tcÞ KU 1 tps1 tpb  r
 
BL
SL
ð5Þwhere KL is the cost of equity capital for a levered ﬁrm, KU is the cost of equity capital for an unlevered ﬁrm, r is the interest
rate on bonds, tc is the corporate tax rate, tps is the tax rate on equity income for shareholders, tpb is the tax rate on interest
income for bondholders, BL is the levered ﬁrm’s borrowings and SL is the levered ﬁrm’s market value of equity.
This equation suggests that a ﬁrm’s cost of equity capital increases with its ﬁnancial leverage, and that this leverage in-
duced equity premium decreases with corporate taxes and increases with the personal level tax penalty of interest income
versus equity income deﬁned as (1  tps)/(1  tpb). Dhaliwal et al. (2006) ﬁnd evidence supporting these predictions.
2.3. Capital gains lock-in
Capital gains tax has its own unique research implications. Capital gains tax is only levied when investors sell an asset and
on the realized appreciation of the asset. A mere appreciation in value of an asset in an investor’s investment portfolio does
not trigger capital gains taxes. When an investor considers the selling of an asset, he has to take into account the tax cost of
selling the asset. Selling will accelerate the realization of capital gains taxes making the investor reluctant to sell. This causes
a reduction in the supply of that asset in the market and an increase in its price (Klein, 1999; Viard, 2000). This is called the
lock-in effect of capital gains taxes.
Of course, with perfect tax capitalization when the investor initially acquires the asset, lock-in need not happen. However,
when we have unexpected price appreciations (George and Hwang, 2007), unexpected capital gains tax rate changes (Dai
et al., 2008), transitions from short-term capital gains to long-term capital gains (Reese, 1998), or incomplete initial capital-
ization, lock-in can happen when an investor considers the sale of an asset. Evidence on the lock-in effect would demonstrate
that tax is an important cost of holding an asset.
2.4. Tax aggressiveness
Tax aggressiveness is a line of literature that has gained a lot of attention lately. In the US, ﬁrmmanagers prepare ﬁnancial
statements based on GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) and tax returns based on the IRC (Internal Revenue
Code). GAAP and the IRC are often different from each other, causing a divergence between income based on GAAP and in-
come based on the IRC (a book-tax difference). Firm managers also actively manage GAAP income upward and taxable in-
come downward, further widening this divergence or book-tax difference. Therefore, a ﬁrm’s tax aggressiveness is reﬂected
in its magnitude of book-tax difference or effective tax rate (Dyreng et al., 2008). It can also be reﬂected in its use of tax shel-
ters (Wilson, 2009).
Hanlon (2002) shows that ﬁrms with large book-tax differences have less persistent earnings. Tax aggressiveness also af-
fects ﬁrm value. Desai and Dharmapala (2006, 2009) argue that tax aggressiveness is associated with agency costs. In ﬁrms
with poor corporate governance, tax aggressiveness destroys ﬁrm value. Chen et al. (2010) show that a unique agency con-
ﬂict between dominant and small shareholders in family ﬁrms causes them to be less tax aggressive. Graham and Tucker
(2006) show that tax aggressiveness (use of tax shelters), as a form of non-debt tax shield, also reduces ﬁrms’ borrowing.
3. China topics
3.1. Following MM
A lot of China-related tax research has focused on how changes in tax policies affect ﬁrms’ capital structure. For a period
of time, Chinese ﬁrms’ capital structure has been thought to be set exogenously and constrained largely by ideology and gov-
ernment control. This is especially true at the time a ﬁrm is established and publicly listed. However, with the development
of China’s reforms and capital markets, more and more ﬁrms are using market mechanisms to compete for resources. There-
fore, the formation of ﬁrms’ capital structures has evolved into an endogenous process. A few important tax policy changes
have provided great settings for tax research in China.
In 2000, the central government rescinded the so-called ‘‘tax-and-refund’’ preferential tax treatment to listed ﬁrms. The
rescission started in 2002. ‘‘Tax-and-refund’’ means that while the central taxing authorities will tax ﬁrms at 33%, local gov-
ernments will refund 18% of the taxes to ﬁrms. A purpose of this policy is to assist local ﬁrms’ competitiveness when they do
not receive preferential tax treatment from the central government. The rescission of this policy effectively increases many
ﬁrms’ corporate tax rates. Based on Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), ﬁrms will increase their reliance on debt in order to
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and-refund’’, there is no signiﬁcant difference in ﬁnancial leverage between ﬁrms that enjoy this tax beneﬁt and ﬁrms that do
not enjoy this tax beneﬁt, after the rescission, ﬁrms that formerly enjoy this beneﬁt start to increase their ﬁnancial leverage.
The new 2008 Corporate Tax Act uniﬁes tax rates for domestic and foreign ﬁrms in China. Before 2008, domestic ﬁrms
were taxed at 33% while foreign ﬁrms and others that received preferential tax treatment were taxed at 15%. After 2008,
tax rates for these ﬁrms gradually converge to 25%. In other words, the tax rate for domestic ﬁrms formerly not receiving
preferential tax treatment decreases while that for foreign ﬁrms or ﬁrms formerly receiving preferential tax treatment
increases. Therefore, ﬁnancial leverage should decrease for ﬁrms formerly not receiving preferential tax treatment and it
should increase for foreign ﬁrms and ﬁrms formerly receiving preferential tax treatment. Wang et al. (2010) ﬁnd results sup-
porting these predictions.
In examining the effect of tax regime changes on capital structure, Chinese ﬁrms’ ownership structure offers a special
twist. State ownership affects ﬁrm behavior and value and therefore the effect of tax regime changes differently from
non-state-owned ﬁrms. Firms with high state ownership tend to have a closer relationship with the government and there-
fore tend to shoulder more social responsibilities, including paying more corporate taxes (Wu, 2009). Further, these ﬁrms are
less likely to incorporate ﬁrm value maximization in their decision making process when pursuing social responsibilities. In
fact, to the government, both the proﬁts of state-owned ﬁrms and the taxes that they pay represent increases in government
wealth. Therefore, state-owned ﬁrms have lower incentives to managing their tax bills than non-state-owned ﬁrms. Wang
et al. (2010) ﬁnd that after the 2008 tax act, state-owned ﬁrms are less sensitive to the change in the debt tax shield than
non-state-owned ﬁrms.
3.2. Unique topics in China
Of course, the above examples are largely based on MM theories. It is important to keep in mind that China is very dif-
ferent and unique from more developed western economies. Reasoning based on western economies often does not work
properly in China. However, this only adds glamour to China research.
For example, taxation in China is sometimes not directly dependent on a ﬁrm’s income or revenue. Every year, tax will
increase by a predetermined percentage set at the beginning of the year regardless of a ﬁrm’s performance. Miraculously,
this target is often met. It would be an extremely interesting topic to examine how ﬁrms negotiate their tax liabilities with
the government.
Further, during the last three decades, China went through many regulatory and law changes, a lot of which involved tax
laws and ﬁnancial reporting. China used to have almost perfect book-tax conformity. However, with convergence towards
IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) and the 2000 Corporate Income Tax Act, book-tax differences have in-
creased. Earnings and tax management further increases the gap between book income and taxable income. Managers have
to balance ﬁnancial reporting costs and tax costs in their decision making process. For example, China’s tax law does not
allow a deduction for inventory devaluation. When a ﬁrm decides to increase earnings through a reduction in the allowance
for inventory devaluation, taxable income is unchanged. Therefore, ﬁrms may manage non-taxable items to reduce the tax
costs of earnings management. This phenomenon is more pronounced for ﬁrms in high tax brackets than for ﬁrms receiving
preferential tax treatment (Ye, 2006). Large book-tax differences may also suggest that ﬁrms have low accounting quality.
Wu and Li (2007) ﬁnd that earnings persistence is lower for ﬁrms with large book-tax differences.
Large tax law changes also provide opportunities for examining tax-induced earnings management. Using the 2008 Tax
Act as an example, tax rate changes affect different ﬁrms differently. Firms whose tax rates are expected to decrease may
delay earnings recognition. The case for ﬁrms whose tax rates are expected to increase may not be that obvious. Because
tax rates increase gradually, these ﬁrms have to balance the beneﬁt of a lower tax rate now and time discounted tax liabil-
ities in the future. The incentive to accelerate earnings recognition is less pronounced. Wang et al. (2009) ﬁnd results sup-
porting these predictions.
From a different angle, Chan et al. (2010) investigate whether departure from a tax-based accounting system towards IFRS
convergence in China encourages tax noncompliance and whether weakened book-tax conformity affects the informative-
ness of book-tax differences for tax noncompliance. They ﬁnd that as book-tax conformity decreases, tax noncompliance in-
creases and that the informativeness of book-tax differences on tax noncompliance attenuates as book-tax conformity
weakens. This is an excellent study that utilizes regime changes in taxation and ﬁnancial reporting.
China’s recent reform onwage deductions for tax purposes can also provide a lot of research opportunities. This reform can
have a deep impact on ﬁrm’s cost of capital, ﬁnancial leverage, labor costs, etc.Whilewages are always deductible in theUS and
other western economies, the lack of a regime change makes empirical analysis difﬁcult to perform in these countries.
3.3. Techniques
As reﬂected in the examples that we use above, event studies are important to tax research. There are basically two types of
events, ﬁrm-speciﬁc events and common events. Firm-speciﬁc events include earnings announcements, ex-dividend days,
management earnings guidance, etc. Common events include reporting and disclosure rule changes, tax regime changes, etc.
Tax regimes changes are natural experiments that often provide great opportunities for studying tax issues. Recent successful
papers areWuandYue (2006),Wang et al. (2009, 2010), etc. Do pay attention to tax regime changes and conduct event studies.
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story, or use words to tell your story. Either can work. However, often, a little math can help. So, do your algebra properly.
4. Use imagination in research
For every phenomenon in life, there is a tax explanation! This is perhaps an exaggeration but of course we do not ask you
to take this literally. But if tax takes away 30% of our earnings, it is going to have a major impact on our behavior and
attitudes. In many situations, its impact is likely big. By keeping the effect of taxes in mind, we can potentially ﬁnd answers
to many of life’s persistent questions.
There are many examples. Elton and Gruber (1970) provide a tax answer to why stock prices do not drop by the amount of
dividends. We already know that the debt tax shield increase ﬁrm value. However, the presence of non-debt tax shields can
crowd out the effect of debt, making it less effective in enhancing ﬁrm value. Graham and Tucker (2006) show that tax shel-
ters can be a non-debt tax shield that can reduce debt usage and explain why ﬁrms sometimes use debt sparingly. In fact, any
deduction can be a non-debt tax shield, wages, stock options, etc. If it is large, it can affect ﬁrms’ debt usage and value. Taxes
can even explain long-term reversals in stock returns. George and Hwang (2007) show that investors’ rational reactions to
locked-in capital gains better explain long-term reversals in US stock returns than irrational overreaction to news. In Hong
Kong where capital gains are not taxed, reversals are nonexistent.
So keep tax in mind when looking for answers. If family ownership affects tax aggressiveness, then maybe organized labor
can also affect tax aggressiveness. If tax aggressiveness affects equity value, then maybe it also affects debt pricing and cov-
enant restrictions. If tax law changes affect earnings management incentives, then maybe they also affect employment and
labor costs.
5. Do China research, do tax research, and be successful
According to a recent IMF report, the size of China’s economy is expected to surpass that of the US by 2016 due to eco-
nomic growth and exchange rate adjustment. This, if it comes to reality, will certainly add to the legitimacy of economic,
ﬁnancial and accounting research of the world’s currently second largest economy and the most populous nation, China.
Currently, much of the accounting research revolves around the US. For example, theories are formulated based on US
institutional settings and empirical analysis is based on US data. Recently, China researchers have certainly eked out a niche
of China research following paradigms developed in western economies such as the US. However, we believe that the view
that China research has to be based on western theories and provides a setting that is not available in the west but is con-
ducive to testing westerns theories is perhaps wrong. If this is the case, then China research serves only to provide external
validity for western theories and we lack legitimacy for our own research. China’s success and failure stories are different
from those from more developed economies. Or, researchers have not developed a theory general enough to explain all phe-
nomena in all economies, developed or developing. If we do not have that theory, then we will have to tell China stories,
which would suggest that China research is unique and important in its own right.
Having said that, we have to admit that this article is written largely based on theories developed in western economies.
What we want to argue is that if these theories cannot explain China, do not panic as this is perhaps a good thing. We should
not be shy about telling our own stories and developing our own theories.
Finally, do China research, do tax research, and you will be successful.
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